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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Catherine Fernandez appeals from an order of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, which dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Fernandez filed a complaint in July 2020, alleging that the Board of Education of 
Pemberton Township and the Pemberton Township High School discriminated and 
retaliated against her from September 2005 to 2018, when Fernandez’s daughter was a 
student at Pemberton High School.  Dkt. #1.  The District Court noted that her claims 
appeared to be time-barred, as the complaint was filed more than two years after 
Fernandez’ daughter graduated in June 2018.  Order, Dkt. #2.  The District Court also 
noted that the complaint failed to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement of the claims” asserted.  Id.  The 
Court gave Fernandez 30 days to amend the complaint, and later granted her additional 
time to file an amended complaint.  Dkt. #5. 
 Fernandez’s amended complaint raised federal civil rights claims of discrimination 
and retaliation and state law claims against the defendants.  Fernandez stated that the 
complaint was based on incidents that “happened from 2005 to 2020,” but the complaint 
only mentions dates past 2018 in four places:  (1) “The defendants hired a lawyer to 
express their disregard to the plaintiff until 2020,” Dkt. #7 at 51;  (2) “The plaintiff 
engaged in a protected activity to intervene to protect her child by reporting injuries, 




2020,” id. at 58; (3) “The plaintiff’s disabled child graduated in 2018; however, the 
defendants engaged in disregard to the plaintiff through the defendant’s lawyer until 
2020,” id.; and (4) “They used an attorney until February 2020 to continue to cause the 
plaintiff distress. Where the plaintiff learned in February 2020 the extent her disabled 
child’s demoralization and low self-esteem from the defendant’s many years of deliberate 
indifference,” which caused Fernandez to have “thoughts of suicide for failing to protect 
her disabled child from the defendants,” id. at 60. 
 The District Court determined that Fernandez’s claims were time-barred and that 
equitable tolling of the period of limitations was not warranted.  Opinion, Dkt. #12 at 3-4.  
The District Court also concluded that the amended complaint did not meet the 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, as the complaint consisted largely of legal conclusions 
that were not connected to any conduct by the defendants.  Dkt. #12 at 5-6.  The District 
Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  Id. at 
6.  The Court also determined that because the claims were time-barred, further leave to 
amend would be futile.  Id.  Fernandez timely appealed.1 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
sua sponte dismissal of the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is 
 
1 Fernandez also filed a motion for reconsideration in the District Court.  We lack 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of that motion, as Fernandez did not 





plenary.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “We may affirm a 
district court for any reason supported by the record.”  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 
187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 We agree with the District Court that Fernandez’s constitutional claims and state 
law claims are all governed by a two-year statute of limitations.  See Dique v. New Jersey 
State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); Save Camden Public Sch. v. Camden City 
Bd. of Educ., 186 A.3d 304, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 2018).   
Fernandez argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her suit as untimely 
mainly for two reasons.2  First, she argues that the District Court should have applied 
equitable tolling to the two-year period of limitations.  But we agree with the District 
Court that even if Fernandez were having some mental health difficulties during the 
limitations period, they did not prevent her from making filings in her daughter’s federal 
lawsuit during that period.  Second, she argues that the District Court should have applied 
a six-year period of limitations that applies to breach-of-contract claims.  But even if 
 
2 To the extent that Fernandez argues that any incidents occurred within the period of 
limitations, or that some type of continuing violation doctrine should apply to render her 
claims timely, we disagree.  Fernandez’s vague allegations that the defendants used an 
attorney in 2020, or that she discovered the extent of her daughter’s emotional damage 
within the period of limitations, cannot state a claim for relief.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 





Fernandez had pleaded a valid, timely, breach-of-contract claim in her amended 
complaint (she did not),3 such a claim would arise under state law.  Because the only 
claims over which the District Court had original jurisdiction—that is, her federal 
claims—were time-barred, the District Court could properly decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that might be timely.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3). 
We also agree with the District Court that even if the claims were timely, 
Fernandez’s amended complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
Fernandez did not make any plausible claims that the defendants discriminated against 
her or retaliated against her.  Fernandez’ amended complaint explained the emotional 
distress that she felt because of the way she believed the school treated her and her 
daughter.  But no allegations support her conclusory statements that the defendants 
discriminated against her because of a protected ground or retaliated against her in some 
way prohibited by the Constitution or federal statutes.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80.4 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.5 
 
3 Fernandez’s conclusory statement that “[t]he defendants breached a Parent-Student-
School agreement” is not sufficient to state a claim.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 
4 Fernandez also challenges the District Court’s order denying her motion for 
appointment of counsel.  Because her claims are all time-barred, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying her motion.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153, 
155 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
5 Fernandez has filed a motion to extend the time to file a reply brief, App. Dkt. #15, and 
a motion for appointment of pro bono counsel, App. Dkt. #16.  Appointment of counsel is 
not warranted, as her claims are time-barred.  See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153.  And because 
she seeks an extension of time in order for appointed counsel to file a reply brief, we 
deny that motion, too.  
6
